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Cover Story : The Battle for Control of Salada Foods

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A deal that left more questions than answers

What did Donovan Lewis, Chairman of Three Bears see in Salada Foods that nobody else saw? How about a pre-tax profit of JA$482,906,847.38

The latter part of 2008 saw Christopher Berry, Chairman of Mayberry Investments and Donovan Lewis, Chairman of Three Bears in a one sided battle for control of Salada Foods. What did they see and know that other players in the market didn’t?

On the 15th July 2008, the announcement on the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) website was that “Salada Proposed A Stock Split”. Salada Foods Jamaica Ltd advised that at a meeting of the company’s Board of Directors to be held on July 22, 2008, the directors would be considering a split of the company’s share.

On the 25th of July in 2008, the following was posted on the JSE website “Stock Split-Salada Foods.”

“The Board of Directors of Salada Foods Limited has advised that the Directors have decided on the following matters at its meeting held on July 22, 2008:
a. To increase the number of authorized shares in the company from ten million four hundred thousand to five hundred million ordinary shares of no par value by the creation of four hundred and eighty nine million six hundred thousand new shares of no par value.
b. From the new shares created the company will issue nine new ordinary shares for every one ordinary share currently held by each member of the company.
c. To call an Extraordinary General meeting of the shareholders’ to be held on August 28, 2008, at 3 p.m., at the Hilton Kingston Hotel to put forward the above stated Ordinary resolutions and
d. To put forward at the meeting Special resolution for the adoption of Articles of Incorporation of the company and cancel the existing Articles and Memorandum in substitution therefore. “
There was no indication from this report what the intention of this move might be; was it to increase the company’s share capital to fund projected growth and expansion, or was it designed to raise funds to pay down expensive debt?.

At the time, the company’s stock was trading between JA$130 and JA$135 per unit having started the year at JA$44 and would go as high as JA$150 before the end of the year on very low trading volumes (see table below). It could therefore be assumed that the stock split was designed to allow the shares to trade in smaller denominations thus attracting more investors. But was this the real value of the stock? Or was this the result of rampant speculation driving the price up?

SALADA MONTHLY
TRADING VOLUMES 2008

Jan 1,899,214
Feb 90,822
Mar 67,615
Apr 14,014
May 29,386
Jun 850
Jul 3,620
Aug 1,149
Sept 1,235
Oct 1,175
Nov 30,150
Dec 94,500

Did the volume of stock trades warrant this kind of move in the stock price? One could hardly take these low levels of trades as a serious bid to wrestle and secure control. Still, more unanswered questions.

What did Salada have to offer?

For the financial period ending September 30th 2008, Salada posted revenues of $393.8M an increase of $51.1M or 14.9% over 2007. Profit before tax was $114.0M compared to $102.6 for the corresponding period in 2007. Net profit attributable to shareholders was $75.3M compared to $68.2M. Earnings per share (EPS) was $7.25 compared to $6.56.

“I can’t think of anything special or specific at the time that would warrant a stock price war and battle for control of Salada foods, other than a good brand name and reasonable good export growth prospects I don’t see much else”, according to one financial analyst when asked the question. That also seemed to be the perspective of a number of other industry watchers. So what really was it? What did Chris Berry and Donovan Lewis, the two players battling for control, see and know that other players in the market didn’t know and could not see? Was this much ado about nothing or was there really something there? Could it be that there was collusion to drive the stock price up?

One senior business executive suggested that Mayberry’s attempt to secure control by offering $32.50 per share for 51 per cent of the coffee company’s near 10.4 million issued shares was not realistic, as Donovan Lewis controlled just over 60 per cent of Salada, and was not likely to sell to Mayberry to give them the desired control.

So, when Mayberry announced a hostile bid for Salada Foods, at $32.50 per share for 51 per cent of the coffee company’s near 10.4 million issued ordinary shares, investors started to take notice. The offer opened on August 30th and closed September 28th last year. At the time, there were 10,388,320 Salada shares outstanding, which would put Mayberry’s cash offer at approximately J$172.2 million.

The Mayberry bid rivalled that of the August 17th 2008 Donovan Lewis-controlled Three Bears’ offer of $25.82 per share for the remaining 39.77 percent of ordinary stock units in Salada. Mayberry said its cash offer had long-term benefits for the company, including profitability growth potential.

There was, as would be expected, varying views by analysts on the offers. According to one published view, “The move to acquire a 51 per cent shareholding in Salada might be an attempt by Mayberry to prevent Three Bears from increasing its shareholding in Salada by as much as 80 per cent and subsequently delisting the company”. However published statements attributed to Donovan Lewis confirmed that he had no intentions of delisting the company, and was only responding to take-over rules triggered by his current holdings. Others felt it could diversify Mayberry’s business and boost Salada’s share price.

Three Bears, which is based in the British Virgin Islands, surpassed the 50 per cent threshold to trigger a mandatory take-over bid when Lewis or companies controlled by him acquired Three Bears from the Caribbean Investment Fund (CIF) at the end of 2006.

The deal gave Three Bears 2,052,000 ordinary stock units in Salada. Lewis, through Three Bears, subsequently purchased a further 2,018,981, ordinary Salada stock units from the CIF. The combined acquisitions gave Three Bears 60.23 per cent ownership of Salada.

Chief Executive Officer of Mayberry, Gary Peart, in published media reports last year was quoted as saying that “his (Mayberry) firm was prepared to offer more than Three Bears as it believes the acquisition of shares in Salada has sound, long-term benefits.”

“We are prepared to offer close to 26 per cent ($6.68) above the Three Bears’ take-over offer because we believe that the acquisition of shares in Salada has sound, long-term benefit. Salada presents the profile and profitability growth potential that we look for in companies to include in our acquisition strategy going forward, though it’s continuing profitability is not a certainty,” Peart also said.

It’s interesting to note that both bids were significantly below Salada’s then market price of $45.

This begged answers to the following questions.

What triggered the stock movement to 45 dollars per share?

Why were the offer prices for the stock below 45, hovering now between JA$26 and JA$32.5 dollars?

What’s the real value of a Salada stock?

And so a bidding war was on for controlling interest in Salada Foods, and as one analyst said, “it could be that Mayberry is banking on the fact that any price below 45 is a good buy and with an expectation that the price may move back up they will be guaranteed a handsome profit on the deal. And with a bidding war now in play with Three Bears, chances are that the prices will begin to move again. So it appears no matter what Mayberry and Three Bears do by virtue of their actions, each may just get the price movement they seek.”


So was the Salada takeover battle an exercise in futility?

“I have over 60 per cent of the shares and I’m not selling. Is he (Chris Berry) really serious?” commented Donovan Lewis, Chairman Three Bears Limited.

The buzz around Salada pushed the stock price to JA$70 per share and in the face of a clear and unequivocal rejection of an offer to buy controlling interest from Donovan Lewis, Chris Berry’s Mayberry Investments was still pushing. The only question to be answered was why?

Given that Donavan Lewis acquired the stock at $25.82 or $161.5m in total value, this represented a whopping $277m gain in less than ten months. Chris Berry did not do too badly either. Mayberry Investments’ 0.3 per cent share holdings made roughly $1.4 million based on the stock price. Investment managers were reported to be saying at the time that the stock price might even climb further to $80.

The Salada Board subsequently announced that Mayberry had served a written notice upon the Company increasing its take-over bid price from J$32.50 per stock unit to J$40.08 per stock unit. The new price valued the Mayberry bid at $212 million. In response, the coffee company called an urgent meeting of its Board of Directors on September 19, 2008 to consider the Mayberry increased offer.

Mayberry’s move was ahead of the Board’s recommendation that shareholders reject the original bid in August of $172 million, or $32.50 per share, to gain fifty-one per cent (51%) of Salada, rivalling the mandatory bid of $25.82 made by controlling shareholder, Donovan Lewis’ Three Bears. The Salada Board said it had undervalued the holdings. At $70 per share, Salada was valued at $727.2 million ($70 times 10,388,330 stock units in issue). At that price, Mayberry’s holding, a negligible 31,250 units or 0.3 per cent of the Company was worth $2.2m; while Three Bears, which owns 60.23 per cent of Salada or 6,256,891 units, was worth $438m.

Not selling

To secure its targeted 51 per cent bid, Mayberry would have to woo Three Bears to sell some of its holdings. Lewis however is reported to have again said that he would not sell neither would he improve his offer, calling the Mayberry offer a futile exercise. “I don’t know what they are trying to do; that doesn’t make sense,” he said. “I have over 60 per cent of the shares and I’m not selling. Is he really serious?”

Mayberry however remained undaunted indicating that it saw value in the stock and that responses to the offer had been fair so far, indicating that the price offer was a result of Mayberry’s re-evaluation of the stock.

Lewis said that even at the new price, Mayberry’s rival offer could not succeed. He said that, “no one at the company had approached him to sell and that the new $40.08 offer was neither worth the time nor the effort.”

However, Peart said Salada is an illiquid stock and that the price could jump significantly either way. He argued that a lot of shareholders had already taken up the offer saying they had been trying to sell their shares for years but could not find buyers.

As 2008 came to a close, Salada stock price reached as high as JA$150 per unit, driven largely by speculations. The Directors of Salada Foods subsequently advised that they would do a stock split and shareholders were to receive a ten to one offer, consistent with the resolutions put forward at the Extraordinary General Meeting.
With the stock price at JA$150 per share, the value of Donovan Lewis’ share holding in the company moved from JA$161,552,925 to JA$644,459,773, a gain of JA$482,906,847. Mayberry’s investments now had a pre-tax profit of JA$2,411,875.
Was this the end game? Your guess is as good as mine.

Additional Sources: Jamaica Gleaner, Jamaica Observer, Jamaica Stock Exchange, Internet sources

Businessuite Markets

The Big Picture: Rewriting the Cinema Experience for Survival and Growth

Despite challenges, there is optimism. Palace Amusement anticipates a stronger 2025, with a more robust lineup of films and continued financial stabilization through debt reduction strategies. Globally, the National Association of Theatre Owners projects a rebound for cinemas, particularly with the release of delayed blockbusters​.

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The cinema industry is grappling with an existential crisis. Globally, theatres are losing audiences to the allure of on-demand streaming platforms such as Netflix, Amazon Prime, and Disney+. These platforms, now competing directly with Hollywood studios, offer high-quality films featuring A-list talent, making it harder for traditional cinemas to sustain attendance.

Locally, Jamaica’s Palace Amusement Company exemplifies this struggle, recently reporting a one-third dip in attendance and significant losses. Yet, despite the dire headlines, opportunities for reinvention abound.

The Local Scene: Palace Amusement’s Struggles and Innovations

Palace Amusement faces the dual challenge of a global content drought and shifting viewer habits. The lingering impacts of Hollywood’s Screen Actors Guild and Writers Guild strikes exacerbated the situation, delaying blockbusters and leaving theatres to depend on weaker releases. Hits like Barbie and Mission: Impossible 7 in 2023 were followed by a lackluster 2024 lineup, with films like Joker 2 underperforming globally. As a result, Palace recorded a 33% decline in attendance during the first quarter of 2024, leading to a 20% revenue drop​.

To combat these challenges, Palace has taken steps such as introducing 4DX technology at its flagship Carib 5 cinema. This multi-sensory format—incorporating seat movements, water splashes, and other effects—has proven popular, driving higher occupancy rates for certain screenings. However, such innovations alone are not sufficient.

The Global Shift: Lessons from International Players

Around the world, cinema operators are diversifying their offerings and finding creative ways to fill theatre seats:

Alternative Content: Cinemas in Europe and the United States are increasingly showing live events such as concerts, sports matches, and theatrical performances. For example, AMC Theatres in the U.S. streams live concerts and offers gaming nights, turning theatres into multi-purpose venues.

Premium Experiences: Operators like Cineworld have shifted to offering luxurious seating, gourmet food options, and private screening packages, creating an upscale experience that streaming cannot replicate.

Local Content and Festivals: In countries like India and South Korea, cinemas rely on vibrant local film industries to draw audiences. By promoting Jamaican and Caribbean films through local festivals, Palace could engage regional audiences while reducing dependence on Hollywood.

Subscription Models: Subscription services like AMC Stubs A-List and Regal Unlimited allow audiences to see multiple films for a flat monthly fee, boosting attendance and stabilizing revenues.

Digital Engagement: Many cinemas now use robust loyalty apps, personalized recommendations, and gamification strategies to connect with patrons. Palace could enhance its app to drive engagement, offering discounts, virtual rewards, and early ticket access.
Strategies for Palace Amusement

Given the shifting landscape, Palace Amusement could adopt the following strategies to revitalize its business:

1. Diversify Offerings Beyond Films

Transform cinemas into multi-use entertainment hubs. Hosting live events, comedy shows, and esports tournaments can broaden audience appeal.

2. Expand Local Content Investment

Collaborating with Jamaican and Caribbean filmmakers to produce original content would not only support the local creative economy but also attract culturally invested audiences.

3. Enhance the Viewing Experience

Expand 4DX technology to additional locations while exploring other immersive technologies like VR cinema experiences.

4. Build Community Engagement

Cinemas can serve as cultural spaces, hosting film clubs, Q&A sessions with filmmakers, and themed events tied to movie releases.

5. Adopt Flexible Pricing

Dynamic pricing strategies—lower ticket prices during off-peak hours and premium pricing for blockbusters or special events—can maximize revenue.

6. Strengthen Online Presence

Leveraging social media and digital marketing to highlight new experiences and engage with younger audiences is critical. Integrating streaming partnerships, such as limited online releases of local films, could also diversify revenue streams.

The Path Forward: A Reinvented Cinema Experience

Despite challenges, there is optimism. Palace Amusement anticipates a stronger 2025, with a more robust lineup of films and continued financial stabilization through debt reduction strategies. Globally, the National Association of Theatre Owners projects a rebound for cinemas, particularly with the release of delayed blockbusters​.

To secure its place in a rapidly evolving industry, Palace must embrace innovation, diversify revenue streams, and reimagine the cinema as more than a place to watch films. It must become a hub for experiences that unite communities, celebrate culture, and deliver entertainment that streaming cannot replicate.

In the end, the future of cinemas lies not in resisting change but in embracing it—and leading audiences back to the magic of the big screen.

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Why Budget Airlines Are Struggling – And Will Pursuing Premium Passengers Solve Their Problems?

As the LCC model struggles, some budget airlines have begun exploring the idea of catering to premium passengers. This shift involves offering a more robust service package, including additional legroom, better in-flight amenities, and flexibility in ticketing—something traditionally associated with full-service airlines. But is this strategy a viable path forward, or will it merely dilute the distinctiveness of the LCC model?

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Introduction: The Decline of the Low-Cost Carrier (LCC) Model
For decades, the low-cost carrier (LCC) business model has been a game-changer in the aviation industry, enabling millions of travelers to fly on a budget and reshaping the way airlines approach cost structure and pricing.

Airlines such as Southwest, Ryanair, and EasyJet built empires by offering no-frills flights at lower fares, often with ancillary services and fees adding to their bottom lines. However, in recent years, many budget airlines have found themselves struggling as the model faces mounting pressure from rising costs, competition, and changing passenger expectations.

As the aviation industry begins to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, one question arises: Can budget airlines continue to thrive in a post-pandemic world, or should they shift their focus to a more premium customer base? The idea of upgrading service offerings and pursuing more affluent passengers has gained traction among some players in the LCC space. But is this the right move? Will chasing premium customers solve the problems facing the low-cost model?

The Rise and Evolution of Budget Airlines
The origins of the budget airline model date back to the 1970s, with Southwest Airlines often credited as the first low-cost carrier. Founded in 1967 and taking off in the early 1970s, Southwest revolutionized the industry by offering simple point-to-point routes, standardized aircraft, and minimal frills. This made air travel more affordable for a broader segment of the population and set the stage for the global rise of low-cost carriers in the decades to follow.

Ryanair, founded in 1984, is another key player in the LCC space. Under the leadership of Michael O’Leary, Ryanair aggressively slashed costs by charging for extras, eliminating complimentary services, and focusing on the most profitable routes. These strategies enabled Ryanair to offer low base fares while generating significant revenues from additional fees, such as for checked bags, seat reservations, and food.

By the 1990s and 2000s, the LCC model had spread across Europe and North America, with EasyJet and other carriers joining the ranks. By 2000, LCCs represented around 30% of all European flights, and by 2010, low-cost carriers had captured about 40% of the market share in the United States as time progressed, the model started to face challenges, and a growing number of budget airlines began to struggle. What had been an industry-defining strategy was no longer as effective in a landscape marked by high fuel costs, fluctuating consumer demands, and competition from established full-service airlines that had adopted similar low-cost features.

The Struggles of the LCC Model: Rising Costs and Changing Passenger Expectations

Several factors have contributed to the struggles of budget airlines in recent years.

The first and most significant challenge has been rising operational costs. The aviation industry is heavily dependent on fuel prices, and the volatility of global oil prices has made cost forecasting a challenge for budget carriers. While LCCs historically thrived by keeping their operating costs low, recent increases in fuel prices have affected their profitability, especially as they typically do not hedge against these increases as aggressively as larger full-service airlines.

Another challenge for budget airlines is the increasing complexity of the ancillary revenue model. While extra fees for baggage, seat selection, and food have been critical to budget carriers’ profitability, passengers are growing increasingly frustrated with the “a la carte” pricing. As more passengers find themselves nickel-and-dimed for basic services, their loyalty to LCCs is weakening. Many now perceive budget airlines as offering a subpar experience, particularly when it comes to customer service, flight delays, and lack of amenities.

The post-pandemic has also revealed that travelers are willing to pay more for a better experience, particularly in the business and premium travel segments. With business travel rebounding and higher levels of disposable income in some markets, more affluent passengers are seeking out quality services and comfort. In contrast, the budget airline model—which offers limited amenities and often no flexibility—no longer seems as appealing to those looking for convenience and quality in their travel experience.

Will Pursuing Premium Passengers Solve Budget Airlines’ Problems?

As the LCC model struggles, some budget airlines have begun exploring the idea of catering to premium passengers. This shift involves offering a more robust service package, including additional legroom, better in-flight amenities, and flexibility in ticketing—something traditionally associated with full-service airlines. But is this strategy a viable path forward, or will it merely dilute the distinctiveness of the LCC model?

Case Study: JetBlue Airways

One of the most high-profile examples of a budget airline attempting to capture premium passengers is JetBlue Airways. While JetBlue has long been a low-cost carrier, it has gradually transitioned towards offering more premium services. In 2021, JetBlue introduced its “Mint” premium service on select routes, which includes lie-flat seats, gourmet meals, and access to airport lounges.

The introduction of premium service allowed JetBlue to compete with full-service airlines on select routes, particularly transcontinental and international flights. However, despite the success of the Mint service, JetBlue has been careful not to abandon its core low-cost business model. It continues to offer more affordable fare options while gradually adding premium services as an additional revenue stream.

Case Study: Ryanair’s Transformation

Ryanair, traditionally known for its extreme cost-cutting measures and no-frills service, has also made moves towards appealing to a more premium customer base. In 2021, Ryanair launched a premium offering, Ryanair Plus, which includes benefits such as extra legroom, priority boarding, and flexible ticket options. However, Ryanair has been careful to maintain its low-cost core by keeping its basic fares highly competitive.

This dual approach—where LCC’s maintain their low-cost offerings while introducing premium services for a select group of customers—has been viewed as a potential solution to the struggles facing budget airlines. The question remains whether this hybrid approach will be sustainable, especially if passengers expect the same level of service across all routes and price points.

A Comparison with Full-Service Airlines
The traditional model of full-service airlines is based on offering a wide array of services, from lounge access and in-flight entertainment to flexible ticketing and loyalty programs. These airlines have a higher cost structure but also benefit from customer loyalty and premium pricing. Airlines such as American Airlines, British Airways, and Singapore Airlines continue to cater to the premium passenger, with higher ticket prices offset by high levels of service.

For passengers, the experience of flying on a full-service airline is markedly different from that of a budget carrier. Full-service airlines generally provide better customer service, more comfortable seating, higher quality in-flight entertainment, and perks such as airport lounge access for business-class passengers. However, these services come at a premium price. In contrast, budget carriers offer a more utilitarian flying experience but are considerably cheaper for those willing to forgo the luxuries of air travel.

The key question for the future of the LCC model is whether budget airlines can maintain their identity as low-cost carriers while introducing premium offerings that will satisfy a more discerning customer base without alienating their core market of budget-conscious travelers. As airlines seek to strike a balance between these two approaches, the outcome will ultimately depend on the ability to deliver a more flexible, high-quality experience without significantly raising prices.

The Future of the Budget Airline Model
As budget airlines continue to face rising operational costs and shifting passenger expectations, many are considering shifting their focus to attract more premium passengers. Whether this strategy will succeed or dilute the appeal of the traditional low-cost model remains to be seen. However, the growing demand for enhanced services and the increasing willingness of travelers to pay for comfort presents an opportunity for budget carriers to evolve.

The future of the LCC model may lie in finding the right balance between low-cost operations and premium offerings, catering to both price-sensitive and service-oriented travelers. For the time being, the success of this hybrid model will depend on how effectively airlines can leverage technology, streamline operations, and introduce high-quality experiences while maintaining their competitive edge in pricing.

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The Impact of Commercial Bank Rate Policies on Jamaica’s Economic Growth and Investment Landscape

However, a key obstacle to the effectiveness of these policies has been the slow transmission of BOJ rate cuts into the lending rates of commercial banks. The pace at which commercial banks lower their interest rates after the BOJ makes its adjustments has been a source of tension, particularly as high borrowing costs have stifled investment and economic activity in critical sectors such as construction, real estate, the stock market, and broader financial services.

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Introduction: The Tension Between the Central Bank and Commercial Banks
Jamaica’s economic recovery in recent years has been closely tied to the monetary policies of the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), which has used interest rate adjustments as a tool to control inflation, stabilize the currency, and foster economic growth.

However, a key obstacle to the effectiveness of these policies has been the slow transmission of BOJ rate cuts into the lending rates of commercial banks. The pace at which commercial banks lower their interest rates after the BOJ makes its adjustments has been a source of tension, particularly as high borrowing costs have stifled investment and economic activity in critical sectors such as construction, real estate, the stock market, and broader financial services.

The Rate Transmission Challenge
For years, the BOJ has maintained an aggressive stance on controlling inflation, setting the policy rate at elevated levels to curb inflationary pressures and stabilize the exchange rate. The central bank’s decision to raise rates has, however, faced resistance when passed through to consumers. While the BOJ adjusts its policy rate, which is expected to affect market rates and borrowing costs, commercial banks in Jamaica have been slower to adjust their own lending rates. The delayed response from commercial banks in reducing interest rates after the BOJ signals a rate cut has created a disconnect in the economy, frustrating the central bank’s efforts to stimulate investment.

“We are absolutely determined that we have to have a much more efficient transmission system,” Bank Of Jamaica Governor Richard Byles

“Commercial banks have been slow to lower lending rates in response to BOJ adjustments, even as the central bank signals its intention to stimulate growth,” says an economist from the Caribbean Development Bank. “This delay results in a less responsive monetary policy, which weakens the transmission mechanism and hampers economic growth.”

This slow pass-through effect has been especially problematic for businesses and consumers relying on credit to drive spending and investment. High lending rates have made borrowing expensive, discouraging business expansion and large-scale investments, especially in sectors like construction and real estate.

“The group’s financial performance continues to reflect the impact of the ongoing high-interest rate environment in Jamaica, which exerts downward pressure on property values, resulting in lower property income relative to prior year.” Norman Reid Chairman FirstRock Real Estate Investments Limited

The Impact on Key Sectors: Real Estate, Construction, and the Stock Market

1. Real Estate and Construction:

The construction and real estate sectors are particularly sensitive to interest rate movements because of their reliance on financing for property development and home purchases. High interest rates have increased the cost of capital for developers, making it more expensive to finance new projects and slowing down the pace of construction. In addition, potential homebuyers have been discouraged by high mortgage rates, further dampening demand in the housing market.

Jamaican developers and real estate professionals have expressed frustration with the lack of affordability. “With borrowing costs so high, it has become increasingly difficult for developers to undertake large projects or offer affordable housing to the average Jamaican,” said a prominent Jamaican real estate developer in an interview with the Jamaica Observer. “This is not just about the cost of money, it’s also about the ripple effect of slower growth in the construction industry, which impacts employment and related sectors.”

“Owing to higher policy interest rates by the Bank of Jamaica, which moved from a historic low of half a per cent (0.50) since October 2021 to the current 6.5 per cent, FirstRock Real Estate Investments Limited has been realising lower property income as pressure continues to weigh down property values resulting in a softening of the market.”

2. The Stock Market:

In the financial markets, particularly the stock market, high interest rates have made government securities more attractive relative to equities. As a result, the Jamaican stock market has seen a period of subdued investor activity. When interest rates are elevated, investors tend to favor the guaranteed returns of bonds and treasury bills, which are perceived as lower risk compared to stocks.

The Jamaican stock market has experienced a sharp decline in activity, with reduced liquidity and a diminished appetite for riskier investments. Analysts suggest that the high cost of capital has discouraged companies from seeking capital through equity financing, opting instead for less-expensive debt or leaving expansion plans on hold. “The slow transmission of lower rates from the BOJ to consumers means that the real economy and the stock market suffer as investment slows,” says an analyst at JMMB Group.

3. The Financial Sector:

The financial sector has been one of the primary sectors impacted by the BOJ’s rate hikes. Banks’ profitability is closely tied to the interest rate spread—the difference between what they pay for funds and what they charge on loans. As commercial banks face high borrowing costs, their interest rate margins tend to widen, increasing profits in the short term. However, in the long term, the suppressed demand for loans due to high rates can limit business growth opportunities and create a drag on the overall financial ecosystem.

“The banking sector is seeing increased profitability on loan spreads, but that comes at the cost of reduced lending, which is unsustainable in the long term,” says a financial analyst with Scotiabank Jamaica. “Banks need to balance profitability with growth, and high interest rates are squeezing that balance.”

The Likely Effects of Falling Interest Rates on Key Sectors

1. A Revival in Real Estate and Construction:

As the BOJ begins to reduce interest rates in response to easing inflationary pressures, the real estate and construction sectors stand to benefit significantly. Lower rates would reduce the cost of financing for both developers and homebuyers, unlocking pent-up demand in the housing market and spurring new construction projects.

Industry stakeholders are optimistic about the potential revival of the construction and real estate sectors. “The drop in interest rates will likely create a favorable environment for developers and potential homeowners. Projects that were previously on hold due to financing costs can now move forward,” says a director at the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce. With a focus on sustainable and affordable housing, developers expect to see increased interest in residential projects as mortgage rates become more manageable.

2. A Boost for the Stock Market:

In the stock market, lower interest rates tend to make equities more attractive compared to fixed-income securities like government bonds. As borrowing costs decrease and disposable income rises, consumer spending increases, driving demand for goods and services. Companies that are able to capitalize on this surge in demand are likely to see stronger earnings, which can attract investors back into the stock market.

In addition, lower rates would reduce the cost of capital for companies looking to expand, potentially leading to increased IPOs and capital raises on the stock exchange. A recovery in investor confidence could stimulate trading volumes and liquidity on the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE), enhancing its attractiveness to both local and international investors.

3. A More Dynamic Financial Sector:

The financial sector stands to benefit from a more balanced interest rate environment. Lower rates would stimulate demand for loans and credit products, providing a boost to lending volumes and enabling banks to diversify their portfolios. Banks would also be able to offer more competitive loan products, which would benefit consumers and businesses alike.

In particular, the reduced cost of capital could lead to increased investment in long-term projects, with businesses likely to take on more debt to fund expansion plans. This shift would help create a more dynamic financial sector, capable of sustaining growth in both the short and long term.

Conclusion: A Delicate Balance

The slow pass-through of BOJ rate changes to commercial banks’ lending rates has created challenges for Jamaica’s economic recovery, especially in key sectors like construction, real estate, and the stock market. However, as interest rates begin to fall, the prospects for these sectors are set to improve. Lower rates will encourage investment, promote lending, and make capital more accessible, providing a much-needed stimulus to the Jamaican economy.

As Jamaica navigates the transition to lower interest rates, the effectiveness of the central bank’s policies will depend on how quickly commercial banks respond to rate changes. A more synchronized approach between the BOJ and commercial banks could unlock significant growth potential, driving Jamaica towards a more dynamic and resilient economy.

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138 Student Living Reporting 12 Month Performance Ahead Of Last Year For Both Revenue And Net Profit.

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Overview
The Group’s performance for the 12 months year-to-date is ahead of last year’s performance for both revenue and net profit. The Group generated net profit of $50.2 million for the quarter and $349.8 million for the twelve-month period. Net profit has consistently grown for the 12 months year-to-date period for the last four years.

Average occupancy for the year was 82% which was an improvement over last year’s 81%. The Group closed the year as at September 30, 2024, with an occupancy of 98%.

For the quarter ended September 30, 2024, the Group’s revenue was $372 million, an increase of 8%, when compared to the $342 million recorded in the prior year’s corresponding period. The movement is derived from increases in rates across all halls and other income. As can be seen from the Twelve Months Revenue Graph above, we continue to experience year on year increase in revenue, this trend is expected to continue.

For the current quarter, other income contributed J$44.7 million and J$155.4 million for the twelve months compared to J$28.4 and J$97.4 million for the corresponding periods, respectively. The increase is primarily driven by better utilization of laundry operations and a one-off sale of surplus equipment during the current quarter.

The Group’s activities resulted in an operating profit of J$136 million for the three months ended September 2024, a decrease of 13% when compared to J$155.5 million in the corresponding prior period. The results were negatively impacted by increases in administrative expenses for general insurance, salaries, and internet services, the latter being required to enable enhanced WI-FI services for our residents.

Profit before taxation was recorded at J$56.0 million for the three-month period ended September 2024 when compared to J$64.5 million for the three-month period ended in September 2023 representing a decrease of 13%.

Earnings per stock unit (EPS) for the three months decreased to $0.09 compared to $0.15 for the three-month period to 30 September 2023. Earnings per stock unit (EPS) for the twelve months decreased to $0.67 compared to $0.83 for the year ended 30 September 2023.

Outlook
Our sustained financial performance is testament to our commitment to operational efficiency, prudent cost management and driving additional revenue. This has allowed us to record consistent year over year increases in revenue and profit. Our outlook is that this trend will continue as the demand for quality student accommodation remains strong.

Ian Parsard Chairman 138 Student Living Jamaica Limited

138 Student Living Jamaica Limited (138SL) Unaudited Financial Statements For The Third Quarter Ended September 30, 2024

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Seprod’s Jamaica Business Banking On Overcoming Sluggishness In Retail Space

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Highlights From Seprod Limited (SEP) – Unaudited Financial Statements for the 3rd quarter ending September 30, 2024

Q3 performance (July-September 2024)
For the three (3) months ended 30 September 2024 (Q3), the Seprod Group achieved revenues of $35.10 billion, an increase of $7.35 billion (27%) over the corresponding period in 2023.

Gross profit closed at $9.80 billion, an increase of $1.76 billion (39%) above the corresponding period in 2023.

The net profit was $828 million, a decrease of $154 million (16%) versus the corresponding period in 2023 when profits were boosted due to a non-recurring gain of $363 million on net profit and $442 million on other comprehensive income in respect of the restructuring of A.S. Bryden’s post-employment medical plan.

Effective 9 July 2024, A.S. Bryden & Sons Holdings Limited (ASBH) acquired 44.8% of the share capital of Caribbean Producers (Jamaica) Limited (CPJ), a company incorporated and domiciled in Jamaica which is a leading food and beverage distributor for major global brands with a focus on serving hotels and resorts in Jamaica and St.Lucia. CPJ’s results have been consolidated in these financials.

Q3 year-to-date performance (January-September 2024)
For the nine (9) months ended 30 September 2024 (Q3 year-to-date), the Seprod Group achieved revenues of $93.43 billion, an increase of $11.23 billion (14%) over the corresponding period in 2023.

Gross profit closed at $24.72 billion, an increase of $3.86 billion (19%) above the corresponding period in 2023.
The net profit was $2.97 billion, a decrease of $551 million or 16% versus the corresponding period in 2023.
The less than the usual stellar performance was influenced by a definite slowness in the economy post the Beryl hurricane in July plus the USA travel advisory to Jamaica that led to a material reduction in the hotels’ occupancy rates.

Outlook
 The Group anticipates a strong last quarter performance from ASBH as we enter the Christmas season and Carnival band launches.
 ASBH had no profit uplift from CPJ in this quarter, this will turn around in Q4 as the winter tourist season gets going in Jamaica, with the hotels already reporting stronger booking than last quarter experience.
 Seprod’s export is at 20% growth this year and that will close the year even higher.
 Seprod’s Jamaica business is banking on overcoming the sluggishness in the retail space, coupled with reducing cost and improving productivity.

As we look to the last quarter of the year we remain optimistic that we will produce a strong performance that will enable us to partially close the YTD gaps.

Richard R. Pandohie Chief Executive Officer Seprod Limited (SEP)

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